In anonymous platforms like the Internet, committing to honor the outcome of an auction is difficult since the seller can benefit by reauctioning the good. We argue that how information is processed within the auction mechanism is crucially important in such circumstances. In our model, the seller uses an intermediary to extract information from the buyers but is not tied to sell the good with terms that the mechanism proposes. Instead, she may reauction the good again via some other intermediary. There are no restrictions on how many times and through which mechanisms the good can be reauctioned. The buyers may also choose their outside option at any stage of the game. We argue that a sequentially rational seller can only implement a version of the English auction, in particular the popular version where bidders employ proxy bids. This is a consequence of the informational properties of the English action: it reveals just the right information for the seller to be able to commit to the mechanism. JEL Classification: C72, D44, D78
Introduction
That the rules of an auction mechanism are not altered -and that the bidders trust this being the case -is a central prerequisite for the mechanism to work properly. For the seller, who is usually in the position of designing the mechanism, this requires a variety of commitments regarding communication, allocation, and payment processes. Commitment is especially important for the seller since, as demonstrated by McAdams and Schwarz (2007a,b) , it is typically she who bears the costs associated with rule-breaking; forward looking buyers anticipate any ex post redesign of the mechanism, and adjust their play accordingly at the interim stage. This commitment problem can be seen as the reason for the markets for intermediaries. Their business is to help the seller commit to the rules of the game.
But in anonymous platforms like the Internet, intermediaries or third parties may only have limited capacity to prevent parties from violating the rules of the game. And there are many ways to bend them. For example, the seller may cast shill bids or the buyers may shade their bids, there may be ex post bargaining over the good, etc. (see Boyd and Mayo, 2000) . 1 The most obvious way for the seller to change the rules is not to honor the mechanism once it has been played and the outcome has been determined. Instead, she may reauction the good via another mechanism.
The job of online auctions such as eBay, u-Bid, or Amazon is to determine the winner and the price of the auction on the basis of bids, i.e. to serve as an infomediary -a device through which communication takes place. 2 However, as the above discussion suggests, they cannot enforce the trade. 3 From the theoretical point of view this is a problem since the seller does have an incentive to reauction the good via another mechanism after the mechanism has been run, in order to extract further surplus from the winner. A curious fact is that this appears to happen very rarely. 4 We argue that the reason why the online auctions can be credibly committed to is the way information is being processed within them. 5 We study auction mechanisms that can be implemented when the seller can change the rules of the game by reauctioning the good once the auction mechanism has been executed but before the physical transaction has taken place. No restrictions are put on how many times the good can be reauctioned nor what the structure of a new auction mechanism may be. Also the buyers can leave the game whenever they want. We show that the way online auctions are designed can be seen as a rational response to the commitment problem -it allows parties to commit credibly to the original mechanism.
The most common online auction mechanism is the ascending English auction or its versions (by Lucking-Reiley, 2000a, they cover almost 90% of the online auctions). The popularity of the English auction is striking since it is not, in general, among the most pro…table auction mechanisms (Myerson, 1981) . 6 The variant that almost all the auction sites (including the aforementioned ones) encourage the sellers to use is the one where bidders post a con…dential proxy or maximum bid and the winning bidder (bidder with the highest proxy bid) pays the price of the second-highest bid. This implementation of the English auction reduces bidding costs as the bidders do not have to stay online during the time the auction runs. From the viewpoint of the bidders, the proxy ascending auction is equivalent to the second price (Vickrey) auction as they cast a single bid and the winner pays the second highest bid. However, from the viewpoint of the seller the two mechanisms di¤er as the proxy ascending auction does not reveal the value of the winning bid. The only publicly revealed pieces of information are (i) the identity of the winner, (ii) the value of the second highest bid. 7 We shall argue that for the seller to be able to commit to the mechanism, it is crucial that the auction mechanism does not reveal too much information. Our main result is that, in the absence of commitment, the only mechanism that can be credibly implemented is the English auction, or one of its versions (e.g., the proxy bidding mechanism).
An eloquent example of why too much information may render an auction mechanism unworkable can be found in Lucking-Reiley (2000b). He describes how the operation of the Vickrey auction by a stamp auctioneer becomes jeopardized as the auctioneer is not able to commit to the rules of the game. Once the value of the highest bid is known, the seller faces an irresistible temptation to raise the price by pretending that another bid was received just under the maximum amount. Of course, knowing this, the bidders are reluctant to reveal their true willingness to pay. 8 Note that the English auction would not have been subject to the same concerns since it would only have revealed the second highest bid to the stamp auctioneer. To understand why the English auction can be committed to, a little more machinery is needed.
To model the idea that the parties do not have commitment power, we assume that there are no physical costs of changing the rules of the game, and that the rules can be changed any number of times. To operationalize this idea, we decompose a mechanism into two parts, an information processing device and an implementation device. The information processing device can be interpreted as a trusted infomediary like an online auction site. Its role is to transform reliably the buyers'messages to an output -a public signal. For example, in the …rst price auction the pro…le of bids serves as the public signal. No technological constraints are imposed on the form of the information processing device. The task of the 6 However, the English auction may be optimal in a restricted class of mechanisms, see e.g. Milgrom and Weber (1982) or Lopomo (1998 Lopomo ( , 2001 ). 7 Many auction sites, including eBay, also make the other losing bids publicly veri…able. 8 See Rothkopf et al. (1990) for a similar argument.
implementation device is to implement a physical outcome contingent on the signal or "recommendation" generated by the information processing device. In the context of the …rst price auction, the task of the implementation device is to sell the good to the highest bidder with the price of his bid. The key assumption we make is that neither the bidders nor the seller can commit to the implementation device. That is, ex post, after the information processing device has done its job and the signal has been produced, the seller can turn to another (composite) mechanism rather than implement the outcome suggested by the implementation device. The bidders are always free to choose an outside option rather than accept the outcome of the implementation device.
Our aim is to characterize mechanisms that the seller does not want to redesign, i.e. mechanisms, whose implementation device the seller wants to obey. To this end, we capture the seller's mechanism selection behavior by a rule that identi…es, for each probability distribution p over the buyers'valuations; a mechanism [p] that the seller chooses to implement under the belief p. The rule speci…es the dynamics of the play by specifying how the changing beliefs a¤ect the seller's behavior.
Incentive compatibility requires that the seller can commit to implement [p] under belief p: Two conditions are imposed on that guarantee that a sequentially rational seller can indeed do this. The …rst is that the rule has to be internally consistent: selecting [p] should not be in con ‡ict with obeying later when information is generated within [p] and p is updated accordingly. The second condition is that the rule must be optimal: under any belief p the seller should not be able to pro…t by implementing some other incentive feasible mechanism than [p] in the class of mechanisms that she can commit to, given that she obeys in the future when p is a¤ected. 9 The latter property is dubbed as the onedeviation property. A stationarity condition, which requires that the rule is not conditioned on payo¤ irrelevant information, is also assumed. 10 It should be emphasized that the methods developed in this work do not attempt to challenge or provide an alternative for the standard equilibrium techniques. Rather, the modeling here is meant to be consistent with them. The motivation for the reduced form modeling approach is expositional. Cleaning away the details of the extensive form makes the model simple and transparent, and allows us to focus on the aspects of strategic interaction that are central.
Our main result is that the payo¤ and information structure of any feasible mechanism, i.e., a mechanism chosen by a mechanism selection rule that meets consistency, the one-deviation property, and stationarity is a version of the English 9 Incentive feasibility here requires that the mechanism is incentive compatible and also guarantees the bidders their outside option payo¤ under non-truthful messages. This property, which is called veto-incentive compatibility, is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the bidders to play the game honestly if they can walk away at any stage of the game. 10 Stationarity, which is important for the uniqueness result, can be de…ned in many ways. The key aspect of any de…nition is that the seller's behavior should not be dependent on unnecessary details. This could be motivated by a a desire to avoid computational burden: if the seller has been programmed to implement a mechanism under current belief, and an extra piece of information does not allow her to implement any more pro…table mechanism, then her choice remains unchanged. auction (indexed by a tie-breaking rule). Conversely, the rule that always chooses a version of the English auction is consistent, stationary, and meets the onedeviation property. Thus the English auction or its versions are essentially the only mechanisms that the seller can credibly implement without commitment.
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Our argument is closely related to the famous Coase conjecture which says that in the one buyer scenario the seller without commitment power is forced to sell the good with the price equal to the least possible valuation of the buyer (see Gul et al., 1986; Fudenberg et al., 1985 , Ausubel et al., 2002 . The English auction is robust against commitment problems for an analogous reason. The English auction reveals (i) the buyer with the highest valuation (the winner), and (ii) the valuations of all but the winner. Since the winner is known to have the highest valuation once the output has materialized, the seller cannot commit to sell the good to anyone but the winner with the price equal to the lower bound of his possible valuations, i.e., the second highest valuation. Hence, as the seller cannot commit to change the English auction, she can commit to implementing it. But this implies that the seller cannot commit to any action that could be improved ex post by running the English auction after the outcome has been determined. We show that this constraint is actually very severe: only the English auction itself satis…es it. 12 An important limitation of our model is that, since the signals of the information processing device are public, private communication between the bidders and the seller is ruled out, i.e. the case where the information processing device generates di¤erent signals to the seller and the bidders (Skreta 2010 is, to our knowledge, the only paper in the literature that allows private communication). There are three justi…cations for this assumption. Firstly, online auctions in the real world explicitly ban all private communication between the seller and individual buyers. Secondly, the assumption allows us to avoid the vexed problem of mechanism design under an informed principal. Thirdly, as private communication is likely to make commitment more di¢ cult to achieve (more detailed information than necessary of the buyers'willingness to pay increases the pro…tability of the redesign), the seller would rather employ an intermediary that prevents private signals since the costs from such activity tend to be borne by the seller, as demonstrated by McAdams and Schwarz (2007a,b) . They show, in particular, that when the seller employing the …rst price auction cannot commit not to take further offers, trade may eventually take place after a long delay and with substantial delay cost. Importantly, when the delay cost is low, the resulting mechanism closely resembles the English auction. This is consistent with our model which predicts that only the English auction can be committed to.
Relatedly, it is important that the seller can commit to the information processing device or, equivalently, that the infomediary can commit not to leak information to the seller. As McAdams and Schwarz (2007a,b) argue, this commitment ability can be motivated by the idea that, since the intermediary does not own the object, he should have weak marginal incentives to get a higher price. Moreover, since intermediaries are typically long run players in the market, reputational concerns are more likely to provide them with strong enough incentives not to break the commitment.
Commitment to the information processing device is not a problem when the mechanism can be interpreted as a cheap talk game which does not require private information processing. For example, the English auction can be implemented via cheap talk. See Krishna (2007) , and the references therein, for conditions where this is possible.
This work adds to the literature on mechanism design without commitment by developing a conceptual framework in which commitment to mechanisms can be analyzed in a reduced form, without making detailed assumptions concerning the extensive form game. This simpli…es the analysis greatly, and allows us to circumvent the need to restrict the way the mechanism can be designed or redesigned (apart from allowing private communication between the seller and the bidders). 13 McAfee and Vincent (1997) study a more structured set up where the seller can set a positive reserve price but cannot commit to not re-auctioning the good if the current bids do not exceed the reserve price. Assuming a …xed auction mechanism, they demonstrate that as the lag before potential re-auction becomes short, the sequentially optimal (given re-auctioning) reserve-price produces the same expected revenue as an auction with a reserve price equal to the seller's valuation of the good.
Bester and Strausz (2001) and Skreta (2006) study commitment in the singleagent case where the designer can use a general communication device to extract information from the agent. However, the number of rounds is bounded (two in the case of Bester and Strausz 2001), which allows the problem to be solved backwards. The result found by Bester and Strausz (2001) is that in the one buyer case the best mechanism is still direct (however, Bester and Strausz, 2000, show that with more than one agent this no longer holds). But, as opposed to the revelation principle, contracts are no longer fully revealing since, in equilibrium, the agent randomizes. Skreta (2006) shows that in a multi-stage bargaining game it is still optimal for the seller to post prices in each period rather than extract information via some complicated mechanism.
Skreta (2010) develops techniques for analyzing multi-agent mechanism design problems without commitment. In her framework, the seller can re-auction the good if it has not been previously sold. Unlike in McAfee and Vincent (1997), the seller may now employ any mechanism to do this. There are two key aspects which make Skreta (2010) and this paper quite di¤erent. First, Skreta (2010) focuses on cases in which the number of redesign rounds is bounded (one in most of the paper). Due to discounting, the basic tradeo¤ is between selling fast and reaching the …nal period, in which the seller can commit to the optimal mechanism. In our framework, where there is no cost of redesigning the mechanism, Skreta's (2010) problem would be vacuous as the seller would choose a null mechanism in all but the last period and then implement the optimal one. The second and more important di¤erence is that Skreta (2010) allows private communication, which is a major complication. The main result of the paper is that despite the possibility of private communication, an optimal mechanism is simple and only uses public communication.
The problem of redesign is also akin to the literature on resale in auctions. Much of the focus in this literature has been on identifying the optimal auction with resale.
14 However, this literature is fundamentally di¤erent from the current approach in that once a good is sold, the buyer who obtains the good -and becomes the new seller -is privately informed about his willingness to sell the good. This, in general, jeopardizes e¢ ciency in the after market (due to Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) . Thus the problem no longer has the recursive structure that drives the analysis of this paper; that the design problem and redesign problem are conceptually similar and that they should be solved by using the same principles.
Further connections to the literature are discussed in the …nal section. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 speci…es the set-up and the game. Section 3 de…nes the solution. The results are stated in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 conclude with discussion on the solution concept.
Set up
There is a seller of a single indivisible good and a set N = f1; :::; ng of buyers. Seller's publicly known valuation of the good is 0. Buyer i's privately known valuation i is drawn from a discrete set i R + : Write = i2N i with a typical element = ( i ) i2N , and i = j6 =i i with a typical element i = ( j ) j6 =i .
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Denote by ( ) the set of probability distributions p over ; and by p i the ith marginal distribution of p:
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The set of allocations of the good is A = f(a 1 ; :::; a n ) 2 f0; 1g n : a 1 + ::: + a n 1g; where a i = 1 if the good is allocated to i and a i = 0 otherwise. Write a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ): A money transfer from buyer i to the seller is denoted by m i 2 R + and m = (m 1 ; :::; m n ) is a pro…le of transfers: The set of all outcomes x = (a; m) is then X = A R n + : Now we de…ne a mechanism. A mechanism does two things: processes information and implements an outcome. We separate these tasks. Denote by (X) the set of probability distributions over X: A mechanism is a composite function
consisting of an information processing device h and an implementation device g such that h : ! (S) and g : S ! X;
where (S) is the set of probability distributions over S; an open subset of an Euclidean space: That is, the information processing device h generates, after receiving the buyers' messages, a public signal s 2 S: The signal s is the only information anyone -including the seller -obtains from h. The outcome function g then implements an outcome x 2 X conditional on the realized signal s: That the implementation device is deterministic re ‡ects the idea that the seller cannot make partial commitment, e.g. in the probabilistic sense, to implement an outcome before it is actually implemented. Letting H = fh : ! (S)g and G = fg : S ! Xg denote the sets of information processing devices and implementation devices, respectively, the set of all composite mechanisms is = fg h : ! (X) such that g 2 G and h 2 Hg:
The support of distribution p is denoted by supp(p): Also write h( ) = fs : h(s : ) > 0g and h(supp(p)) = fs : h(s : ) > 0 and 2supp(p)g: Given p, a signal s 2 h(supp(p)) of the information processing device h induces a posterior p( :
To economize on notation, write p( : s; h) = p(s; h). Since the signals are public, p(s; h) 2 ( ) for all s 2 h(supp(p)): By the de…nition of the support, supp(p(s; h)) supp(p) for all h and for all s:
The mechanism g h is constant under p if h(supp(p)) is singleton. A constant mechanism implementing outcome x is denoted by
A constant mechanism does not a¤ect the beliefs and implements the same outcome with probability one. The two mechanisms (g h) and (g Buyer i 's and the seller's payo¤s from the allocation x = (a; m) are, respectively,
Abusing the notation slightly, we may denote the payo¤s of buyer i and the seller from the allocation x = (a; m) by u i (x; i ) and v(x); respectively:
Solution
The seller's problem is that she cannot commit to the implementation device g once the signal s has been produced by the information processing device h. Rather, she may be tempted to design a new mechanism under her post-signal belief. In this section, we identify conditions that the mechanism needs to satisfy for the seller to credibly commit to it. What makes the problem challenging is that we cannot employ backwards induction or a related structure since there is no …nal stage from which to start the recursion. That is, for any past history of redesigned mechanisms, there still exists a chance to redesign the current mechanism. That is why the solution has to be based on a "…xed point" argument.
In other words, whether the seller can commit to a mechanism depends on what mechanisms are available to her ex post, given the post-signal beliefs. But since ex post she can only select from mechanisms that she can commit to -the same question she faced at the ex ante stage -the mechanisms that the seller can commit to need to be identi…ed for all beliefs simultaneously. At the same time, consistency across ex ante and ex post beliefs and the seller's incentives must be honoured.
We solve the mechanisms that can be committed to in two nested parts. First we specify conditions under which, by the revelation principle, the buyers could commit to a direct mechanism. Then we identify conditions under which the seller can commit to a direct mechanism given that the buyers can. This requires de…ning which mechanism the seller would implement under di¤erent (posterior) beliefs, if they were to materialize at the ex post stage of a mechanism. Otherwise one cannot guarantee that the seller can commit to the mechanism in the …rst place.
Buyers' incentives We assume that the buyers can exit any point of the game. Thus any implementable mechanism g h must be ex post individually rational (EXP-IR):
By the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) , an implementable mechanism must be incentive compatible. A mechanism g h is incentive compatible (IC) if
However, incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality are not independent conditions: The right of veto might be exercised at the o¤-equilibrium histories. The following simple extension of incentive compatibility resolves the problem by allowing i to veto the outcome even after his untruthful announcements.
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De…nition 1 (VETO-IC) Given p; a mechanism g h 2 is veto-incentive
Veto-incentive compatibility requires that truthful reporting forms a BayesNash equilibrium even if vetoing is possible after an untruthful announcement. Any implementable mechanism must thus be veto-incentive compatible. For any p; denote the set of veto-incentive compatible mechanisms by
It is easy to see that any veto-incentive compatible mechanism is incentive compatible and ex post individually rational (but not vice versa). 19 Truthful announcements form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a veto-incentive compatible mechanism = g h if the seller can commit to following g after h has performed its information processing task, i.e., produced its signal s. Thus a mechanism maximizing the seller's payo¤ subject to veto-incentive compatibility could be interpreted as the seller's full commitment benchmark. Since vetoincentive compatibility concerns only the payo¤s, any signal structure -even one that fully reveals the buyers'types -is consistent with veto-incentive compatibility. However, while signals do not a¤ect anyone's payo¤ directly, they may do so indirectly, via the seller's behavior at the ex post stage.
Seller' s incentives The seller's expected payo¤ from the mechanism
She wants to maximize her expected payo¤ subject to the constraint of not redesigning the mechanism after observing the signal s from the information processing device h. That is, of replacing the outcome g(s) with another mechanism in that generates her a higher expected payo¤ than g(s). Our task is to identify the conditions under which she will not do that.
Let the seller's (pure) mechanism design strategy be captured by a choice rule that speci…es, for each prior belief p; the seller's choice of the mechanism under these beliefs. Since it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms that the buyers can commit to, the choice rule is assumed to satisfy
18 Veto-incentive compatibility is due to Forges (1998) , and is closely related to IC* of Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) . 19 Choose i = 0 i in (1). We only need EXP-IR and IC in the remainder of the paper.
Then [p] represents the mechanism that the seller implements under p: Rule in turn represents the dynamic mechanism selection strategy of the seller. We now identify properties that the choice rule should satisfy. We argue that the sequential rationality of the seller, and the buyers'knowledge of this, requires that re ‡ect internal consistency and optimization. For these conditions, we need to develop some concepts. We say that a mechanism g h 2 is (weakly) ex post dominated by a mechanism 2 if there is a signal s 2 h(supp(p)) such that
That is, the seller weakly prefers over the recommended outcome g(s), given the ex post beliefs due to signal s. In such a case, the original mechanism g h may be subject to redesign. It is easy to see that for a typical p there is no veto-incentive compatible mechanism that is not ex post dominated. 20 Thus the seller is typically (weakly) tempted to redesign the mechanism. Now we de…ne the set of mechanisms that the seller can commit to today given that is followed in the future. Under prior p; denote by C [p] the set of mechanisms that are not subject to redesign under the hypothesis that is followed ex post:
Hence, by the revelation principle, and under the hypothesis that the seller can commit to the choice rule :
A mechanism is truthfully playable if 2 C [p]; since then it will not be redesigned ex post.
A mechanism is not truthfully playable if 6 2 C [p]; since then it will be redesigned ex post.
Choice set C [p] is de…ned with respect to the assumed rule : We now formally specify conditions that sequential rationality imposes on the choice rule itself. The …rst condition requires consistency in the sense that employing ex ante should not contradict being employed ex post.
De…nition 2 (Consistency)
The second condition implies optimality. Given and p; the seller should choose a mechanism that maximizes her payo¤ in the set C Under the hypothesis that can be committed to in the future, the seller does not want to change under any current prior p: Without the one-deviation property, could not be convincingly committed to.
Note how consistency, the one-deviation property, and ex post dominance play di¤erent roles in the solution. The one-deviation property together with consistency re ‡ects optimization: [p] maximizes the seller's payo¤ in C [p]: Ex post dominance in turn guarantees that this act of optimization is consistent with farsightedness. That is, since is obeyed in the future, not being ex post dominated with respect to [ ] guarantees that a mechanism can be committed to. Indeed the only role of ex post dominance is to test whether the seller can commit to a particular mechanism under the hypothesis that is followed in the future. In particular, the one-deviation property is not implied by ex post dominance. Now we state two straightforward but important implications of consistency and the one-deviation property. First, the seller always implements the outcome of a mechanism that she can commit to. In particular, the choice rule is idempotent in the following sense:
Lemma 1
; for all s 2 h(supp(p)): That is, running twice rather than once will not a¤ect the outcome.
Second, if the seller can commit to implementing an outcome, then that outcome must maximize her payo¤ in the class of individually rational outcomes.
Lemma 2 Let satisfy the one-deviation property. Then
We now check that our solution is consistent with the standard bargaining theory.
The Coase conjecture The Coase conjecture, which pertains to our n = 1 case, argues that when the seller is unable to commit not to sell the good, the buyer is able to extract all the surplus. That is, the outcome of the one-sided bargaining game is to sell the good with price (p), the minimal possible valuation in the support of p: The Coase conjecture has been extensively studied in the non-cooperative bargaining literature, and veri…ed in the so called "gap" case (p) > 0 e.g. by Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul et al. (1986) .
The next proposition shows that the result can be derived also in our set up, without going into the details of the bargaining process. Thus consistency and the one-deviation property do capture the key aspects of sequential rationality.
Remark 1 (Gap
However, it is also well known that in the "no gap" case, (p) = 0; other more complex equilibria can be constructed (see e.g. . To avoid them, the literature often focuses on simple "stationary" equilibria (see e.g.
Ausubel et al., 2001).
The problem with multiplicity of (complex) solutions also applies in our case when (p) = 0. It can be shown that for any 2 there is a choice rule that is consistent and meets the one-deviation property, and sells to types and never to types < of the buyer given the prior p. However, all constructed are complex, and require the seller to condition on seemingly super…cial information. To remove these complexities, our …nal restriction imposes a degree of simplicity on choice rules. It demands that the implemented outcome is not conditioned on information that does not provide more pro…table transaction opportunities.
De…nition 4 (Stationarity) A choice rule is stationary if
That is, signals that do not allow the seller to implement a more pro…table choice do not a¤ect the seller's choice. For example, the choice rule above fails stationarity (see Appendix B for the precise exposition). 21 The next section characterizes the inducible stationary choice rules in the general n 1 case.
Results

Overview
Before formally establishing the results, we give a heuristic account of them. Our main result is that the English auction (or its version) is the only mechanism that the seller can credibly commit to. The core of our argument is simple. The outcome of the English auction reveals exactly the information that is needed for 21 For an analogous restriction, see Ausubel and Deneckere (2001) . the seller to credibly implement this outcome. The reason for this is that the outcome of the English auction separates the possible valuations of the winner from those of the other buyers, and hence the seller cannot commit to not selling to the winner with the proposed price -his least possible valuation given the ex post information. We show that only the English auction has this property.
More speci…cally, we …rst demonstrate that the choice rule where the seller always uses the English auction -or the version which uses all the information contained in the non-winners'valuations to compute the lower bound of the winner's valuation -is consistent. This follows from the fact that running the English auction twice rather than once does not a¤ect the outcome. To prove that the English auction -choice rule also satis…es the one-deviation property, we show that if a mechanism cannot be pro…tably changed by employing the English auction ex post, then the mechanism must, in fact, be outcome equivalent with the English auction itself. This "…xed point" result is obtained via induction on the value spaces of the buyers, and implies that the English auction -choice rule cannot be changed pro…tably with a one-time deviation.
To prove that the English auction -choice rule is the only feasible one, we …rst argue that any seller's choice rule that is stationary and consistent cannot reject (all the versions of) the English auction. This is true since any realization of an English auction reveals the winner and his least possible valuation given the other buyers'valuations. Thus any mechanism that ex post dominates the English auction must threaten the winner to sell the good to the buyer with the second highest valuation, to force the winner to pay a higher price. However, this threat is not credible since when the winner declines the o¤er, the seller cannot commit to not sell -as suggested by the Coase conjecture -to the winner with his least possible valuation. Finally, since some English auction is always feasible, it follows that the mechanism chosen by the seller must be robust against being upset by the English auction ex post. This strong restriction implies, by the …xed point argument made in the previous paragraph, that any choice rule must be outcome equivalent with the English auction -choice rule.
Two modeling aspects complicate the analysis. First, we do not put any restrictions, e.g. in terms of independence, on the distributions of the buyers'valuations. Doing otherwise would require us to impose unnatural constraints on the employed mechanisms since the posterior distributions should also satisfy the restrictions. To cope with general distributions, the English auction has to be modi…ed to take into account all the information hidden in the non-winners'valuations which makes the formal de…nition of the mechanism somewhat more involved than usually. Second, since we cannot assume away the positive probability of an event where at least two buyers have same highest valuation or the highest valuation equals the seller's valuation, the English auction has to be appended with a tie-breaking rule. By consistency, the same tie-breaking rule has to be applied uniformly to the whole English auction -choice rule. Di¤erent tie-breaking rules then give rise to di¤erent English auction -choice rules.
The analysis
The English auction 
Note that w( ) = 0 means that the seller keeps the good when i = 0 for all i 2 N . The buyer w( ) is called "the winner" under the type pro…le , and the set w 1 (i) consists of the type pro…les under which w chooses i as the winner. Our mechanism is indexed by the tie-breaking rule.
Given a prior distribution p and a tie-breaking rule w; we now construct a deterministic mechanism E ( ) = g E h E ( ) ; the English auction: 22 De…ne a set of public signals S E by
and a deterministic information processing device h E : ! S E such that
In words, under type pro…le the information processing device of the English auction produces the signal h E ( ) = (w( ); w( ) ); which makes public the identity of the winner w( ) and all the nonwinners'types w( ) :
The implementation device g E is de…ned on S E : The English auction allocates the good to the winner with the price equal to the least possible valuation of the winner above the second highest valuation. Formally, the winner's money transfer rule is as follows: for any i 2 N; m E (i; i ; p) = minf
That is, m E (i; i ; p) is the least possible valuation of i given the information that (i) i is the winner, (ii) the other buyers'types are i : The implementation device g E : S E ! X is now de…ned, for each buyer j 2 N , for all (i; i ) 2 S E , by
That is,
allocates the good to the winner i = w( ) who pays a price equal to his least possible valuation (i) given the other buyers'types, (ii) the fact that i is the winner, and (iii) p. 23 The corresponding payo¤s are, for all i 2 N;
if 6 2 w 1 (i) \ supp(p): 22 We relax w from the description of the English auction E for notational simplicity. 23 Note that E (p) reveals only the winner's identity and the other players'valuations. Hence it cannot be interpreted as the Vickrey (second-price) auction which asks all buyers to reveal their valuations.
By construction,
E is e¢ cient and the price paid by the winner is less than or equal to his valuation, and at least as high as the other buyers'valuations. 24 Moreover, since the winner i becomes publicly known along with the signal s = (i; i ), the posterior belief p((i; i ); h E ) satis…es
Since the implementation device is a bijection, we may denote the posterior p(s; h E ) simply by p(x; E ). Mechanism E has the familiar pivotal structure: a buyer's payment -and hence his payo¤ -is independent of his announcement as long as he wins (or loses). The impact of lying on his payo¤ cannot be positive since it either induces the buyer to win when he would like to lose, or to lose when he would like to win, given the other buyers'valuations. Since truthtelling is a dominant strategy,
Feasible choice rules To highlight the fact that in the above de…nition the English auction is conditioned on the prior p; let us denote it by E [p]: Keeping …xed the tie-breaking rule for which the English auction is de…ned, the function E : ( ) ! can now be taken as the English auction -choice rule. Di¤erent tie-breaking rules then yield di¤erent English auction -choice rules. Construct a correspondence C E V IC such that
Our aim is to prove that the English auction choice rule is essentially the only rule that can be committed to (up to a tie-breaking rule). The argument is made in two parts, the …rst demonstating su¢ ciency and the second necessity. The result is stated in Theorem 1.
We …rst prove the su¢ ciency -that the English auction -choice rule is consistent and satis…es the one-deviation property. This is done via two lemmas. First, note that the English auction -choice rule, being de…ned with respect to a …xed tiebreaking rule, is idempotent: We now demonstrate that there is no other rule than the English auction choice rule that meets the desiderata. The argument is made in two stages, the …rst demonstrating that any stationary rule that is consistent and meets the onedeviation property induces C that contains E , speci…ed for some tie-breaking rule w: The second part uses this …nding to show that C is contained in C E : Together with Lemma 4, this proves that E is outcome equivalent to any feasible mechanism.
Heuristically, if ex post dominates
reveals the winner and his least possible valuation given the other buyers'valuations, must threaten the winner to sell the good to the buyer with the second highest valuation to force the winner to pay a higher price. However, this threat is not credible since when the winner declines the o¤er, the seller sells -by stationarity and Lemma 2 -to the winner with his least possible valuation.
Lemma 5 (Uniqueness I) Let a choice rule be stationary, consistent, and satisfy the one-deviation property. Then there is a tie-breaking rule w such that
Proof. Construct w as follows: For any 2 ; denote by 1 the degenerate prior such that supp(1 ) = f g: Then there is an outcome x such that [1 ] = 1 x : Let w( ) = i if x allocates the good to i: By Lemma 2, such w( ) satis…es (4) . Use this w to construct E : Suppose, on the contrary of the claim, that there is p such that allocates the good to j:
it follows by Lemma 2 that v(g(s)) v(x): By (7), supp(p(x; E [p])) Y i and, by the de…nition of support,
Thus, by the construction of w; EXP-IR, and Lemma 1,
This implies, by stationarity, that g(s) = x; violating the assertion that x allocates the good to i and g(s) to j 6 = i:
We now use the previous lemma to prove that if a stationary is consistent and meets the one-deviation property relative to C; then there is a tie-breaking rule w such that no element of C[p] is ex post dominated by E [q] for any q:
Lemma 6 (Uniqueness II) Let a choice rule be stationary, consistent, and satisfy the one-deviation property. Then
By the de…nition of one-deviation property,
) supp(q) and, hence, By Lemma 6, a stationary and consistent that meets the one-deviation property is not ex post dominated by an English auction. Hence [p] cannot allocate the good to anyone but the buyer with the highest valuation, i.e., [p] must be e¢ cient. An implication of the lemma is that the commitment inability of the seller leads to an e¢ cient allocation, as suggested by the Coase theorem.
Since [p] is e¢ cient, and the lowest type of a buyer earns zero payo¤, the revenue equivalence theorem implies that E [p] is the (generically) unique implementable mechanism if the buyers' valuations are independent. However, we can say more: by Lemma 4, if the seller is unable to commit, the uniqueness of the implementable mechanisms is a general phenomenon and holds for any prior distribution.
For an illustrative example, let N = f1; 2g and =supp(p) = f5; 10g 2 : Let, say, w(10; 10) = w(10; 5) = w(5; 5) = 1 and w(5; 10) = 2: Take 2 C [p]: Since 1 x is not ex post dominated by E [p(x; )] for any x 2 (supp(p)), ( ) allocates the good to buyer 1 under all 2 f(5; 5); (10; 5); (10; 10)g: Transfers from 1 under = (5; 5) and = (10; 10) are 5 and 10; respectively: By incentive compatibility, transfer from 1 under (10; 5) is 5. Since only (5; 10) allocates the the good to 2, 2s type 2 = 10 is then revealed. Hence, his transfer must be 10; which means that = E [p] under p.
Now we are ready to state our main result. Since
E [ ] is well de…ned (by (4), (5), and (6)), the …rst part of the theorem also proves the existence of a solution.
Theorem 1 1.Choice rule
E is stationary, consistent and satis…es the one-deviation property, for any tie-breaking rule w.
2. If a choice rule is stationary, consistent, and satis…es the one-deviation property, then there is a tie-breaking rule w such that [p] is outcome equivalent to E [p]; for all p:
Proof. That is, the seller can commit to the English auction provided that she does so consistently, under all distributions of the buyers' valuations. Moreover, the payo¤ structure of every feasible auction coincides with that of the English auction (de…ned for some tie breaking rule w). The only di¤erence of a committable mechanism and the English auction may concern additional, payo¤ irrelevant information on the player's valuations. 25 We should stress that the …rst result requires that the tie-breaking rule is well de…ned, and the second that the stationarity condition is satis…ed by the choice rule. While the former assumption is innocent, and a consequence of appropriate modeling, the second one is more substantial. The key justi…cation for stationarity is simplicity. A construction along the lines of would presumably allow the seller to commit to a choice rule that is more complex than the English auction -choice rule.
The generalized Coase conjecture With the stationarity assumption the Coase conjecture can now also be veri…ed in the "no gap" case. By the second part of Theorem 1, if is stationary, consistent, and meets the one-deviation property, then [p] = E [p] which allocates the good to any buyer > 0 with price min w 1 (1)\supp(p) 26 To conclude, our argument can be seen as a generalization of the Coase conjecture which, in the current set up can be formulated as follows:
is the unique feasible mechanism in the n = 1 case when the seller cannot commit to not sell to 25 It is interesting that while full surplus extraction is feasible under full commitment under almost all p (Crémer and McLean, 1988; McAfee and Reny, 1991) , only the English auction is feasible without commitment. 26 If supp(p) > 0, then this number is equal to supp(p): If supp(p) = 0; then it is 0 if the tie-breaking rule allocates the good to the buyer at = 0; and minf > 0 : 2supp(p)g if it allocates the good to the seller at = 0:
the buyer who values the good more than she does. Our more general version of the claim says that in the E [p] is the unique feasible mechanism in the n 1 case when the seller cannot commit to not selling to the buyer who values the good more than the buyer with the second highest valuation. More succinctly: Without external commitment devices, the seller can only commit to the English auction.
Discussion of the solution concept
It is important to understand in what sense our key desiderata -the one-deviation property and consistency -re ‡ect sequential rationality. Suppose that the seller does make a single deviation to her mechanism design strategy : Then under p she chooses another incentive feasible mechanism, say ; rather than [p]; and returns to follow once has been processed and beliefs have been a¤ected accordingly. We argue that the deviation cannot possibly be pro…table for the seller. On the one hand, if following is consistent with the implementation of ; then, by the one-deviation property and consistency of ; could not have been a pro…table deviation to [p] in the …rst place: On the other hand, if following is not consistent with the implementation of ; then will be redesigned ex post according to and, since the deviation was of one-shot nature, the new mechanism is implemented as planned. But by the standard revelation argument, the combination of and its redesign can now be interpreted as a single incentive feasible mechanism that cannot be, by the one-deviation property and consistency of ; a pro…table deviation to [p]: This argument obviously generalizes to all …nitely long deviations to the mechanism design strategy. Hence the one-deviation property and consistency of re ‡ect sequential rationality of the players in the sense that no …nite sequence of deviations to can be pro…table for the seller.
If also in…nitely long deviations are permitted, then an assumption has to be made concerning the payo¤s from in…nite streams of redesigns. There are natural assumptions that guarantee that the results of this paper still hold. Construct an explicit extensive form game in which the seller, at each round, designs an incentive feasible mechanism and then chooses whether to implement the outcome of the mechanism played by the bidders, or whether to design another incentive feasible mechanism to extract further information from the bidders. Also each in…nite terminal history is now associated a payo¤: We conjecture that if the payo¤s are zero when the outcome is never implemented and the future is undiscounted, then the one-deviation property and consistency characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game as in this paper. If, however, the future is discounted or there are other redesign costs, then the equilibria of the game need not correspond to our equilibria (see Skreta, 2010) . Whether the equilibria do coincide in the limit, when the redesign costs tend to zero, remains an open question.
One may wonder whether the ex post domination criterion in the de…nition of the one-deviation property, which is de…ned by a weak payo¤ dominance, is needlessly strong. A natural weaker candidate would be to demand strict payo¤ dominance. Strict domination is, however, in con ‡ict with our basic assumption that the seller's mechanism selection rule is dependent only on the prior p: To see this, consider the n = 2 case and supp(p) = f0g f0; 1g: With the tie-breaking rule w that allocates the good under = (0; 0) to buyer 2; mechanism E [p] would always sell to buyer 2 with price 0: With strict domination criterion, a procedure that sells to 1 under = (0; 0) with price 0 and to 2 under = (0; 1) with price 1 would be not be strictly ex post dominated. And selling to 1 under = (0; 0) with price 0 would be in con ‡ict with E [q] where prior q is degenerate on = (0; 0): Combining strict dominance with sequential rationality would therefore require history dependent choices, and the mechanism selection rule would no longer be de…nable as a function of p.
Conclusion
Mechanism design requires commitment since at the ex post stage, when the mechanism has produced the information needed for implementing the output, the seller may want to change the rules of the game and design a new mechanism. Mechanisms are particularly vulnerable to commitment problems in anonymous platforms like the Internet.
We have studied auction mechanisms that the seller can credibly implement without external commitment devices. To this end, we have developed a new reduced form modeling approach. We recognize that a mechanism does two things: processes information and implements an outcome. We separate these tasks, and relate the latter as the source of the seller's commitment problem. If the seller cannot commit to implementing the outcome once the mechanism has been run, she has an incentive to extract further surplus from the buyers by initiating a new mechanism under the ex post beliefs. Of course, the new mechanism is subject to the same commitment problem, and so on. The objective of the paper is to identify the conditions under which the seller will be able to commit to the mechanism given the consequences of doing or not doing so. This requires that the seller's mechanism design strategy has to be de…ned for all distributions. The two conditions we impose on the seller's mechanism design strategy, which re ‡ect her sequential rationality, are internal consistency and optimization. We show that the only mechanism that satis…es these restrictions as well as a stationarity condition is the traditional English auction (or its version).
At the heart of the analysis is the argument that a sequentially rational seller can always commit to the English auction. This idea can be seen as a generalization of the Coase conjecture (e.g. Fudenberg et al., 1985; Gul et al., 1986 ). In the one buyer case, the claim states that the seller can only commit to sell the good to the buyer with a price equal to his least possible valuation. In the multiple buyers case, the seller can always commit to the English auction since, when the mechanism reveals the buyer with the highest valuation and his least possible valuation (= the second highest valuation), the seller cannot commit to raising the price above this lower bound. Importantly, because the seller can credibly commit to the English auction, she cannot commit to mechanisms that are ex post dominated by the English auction. Our main result is that this constraint is very severe: only the English auction itself satis…es it. 27 Our model provides support for the English auction in the general class of auction mechanisms. Many studies have demonstrated the usefulness of the English auction in a restricted class of mechanisms. In a classic treatise, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that the English auction is optimal among the four standard auction forms when the valuations are a¢ liated, a natural assumption in many auction scenarios. 28 In the same model, Lopomo (1998 Lopomo ( , 2001 demonstrates that the English auction features robustness in a sense that it is optimal among simple sequential auctions and in a class of posteriorly implementable auctions (a concept due to Green and La¤ont, 1987) .
Posterior implementability requires that the buyers'behavior is regret-free in the sense that they would not want to change their behavior even if they knew the outcome of the mechanism. This property is at the heart of the robustness of the English auction and the Vickrey auction. 29 It also partly drives our results. Due to posterior implementability, running the English or the Vickrey auction twice in a row rather than just once will not a¤ect the outcome. But this is only a necessary condition of a feasible auction. On the su¢ cient side, one needs to guarantee that the seller cannot commit to any more pro…table auction at the ex post stage, given the information that is generated by the mechanism. For example, the Vickrey auction, which is posteriorly implementable, is not implementable when the seller cannot commit since it reveals too much information. Finally, our model provides some insights into the literature on optimal auctions under e¢ ciency (e.g. Ausubel and Cramton 1999; Krishna and Perry, 1998). The e¢ ciency restriction is usually motivated vaguely by appealing to "Coasian dynamics", which leads to the e¢ cient allocation of resources through the seller's inability to commit, or resale markets. 30 This paper is explicit on how e¢ ciency emerges as a consequence of sequentially rational redesigns of auction mechanisms. 27 Milgrom (1987) argues that the core implements the e¢ cient allocation under complete information. 28 Including the English, Vickrey, Dutch, and …rst-price auctions. However, Matthews (1987) and Maskin and Riley (1984) show that risk-aversion reverses the ranking. 29 The English auction also satis…es a stronger condition of ex post implementability: that one does not want to change one's own behavior even if one knows the behavior of the other players. See e.g. Bergeman and Morris (2005, 2008) . 30 Zheng (2002) is an exception. He characterizes outcome functions that can be implemented with explicit resale markets. See also Haile (2000) for a formal modelling of retrading.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4 First assume that = g h is deterministic, i.e., ( ) = g(h( )) is singleton for all . We show that g(h( )) = E [p]( ), for all 2 : Denote, for notational simplicity, Y i = f 2 : w( ) = ig for all i:
Since = g h is not ex post dominated by E [p(s; h)]; g(h( )) has to allocate the good to the same buyer as E [p(s; h)] ( ) does, for all s 2 h( ); for all 2supp(p). Since E satis…es Lemma 1, ( ) = g(h( )) allocates the good to the same buyer as 
Noting that (9) holds for all s 2 h(supp(p)); it follows from the above two conditions that
It remains to be shown that the weak inequality in (10) Finally we check the case of random h. Note that even if g h is random, it has to allocate the good to the same buyer as E [p] does. Thus randomness of g h may only concern the monetary transfer m. The proof, which is by induction, proceeds along the above lines. It is easy to verify that (10) holds also for any randomly generated monetary transfer m under 
B Appendix
Non-stationarity of Let n = 1 and assume the "no gap" -case 0 2 6 = f0g: We construct a seller's choice function that allows the seller to commit to any price 2 : De…ne a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er ( ) = (1; ); if ; (0; 0); if < :
That is, "sell with price to any type at least and not sell to type below ": De…ne choice rule such that This result is analogous to , who show that any price can be supported in equilibrium in the one sided o¤ers bargaining game when the discount factor tends to 1. Strategies needed for these equilibria are complicated, i.e. non-stationary.
